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Abstract—In this paper, we first study the performance of
a supply chain consisting of one retailer and one supplier.
The supplier sets the price scheme of some goods and the
retailer then decides the order level and sells the goods in
the market. Specifically, a quadratic cost function is assumed
here to approximate the U-shape cost curve commonly observed
in industries. Two kinds of contracts offered by the supplier
are investigated, namely wholesale price contract and quantity
dependent contract. Wholesale price is fixed under the first
contract but varies depending on order level under the second
one. We show that certain wholesale price contract successfully
induces the retailer to order at a level such that supply chain
profit is maximized, but extra cost in implementation may
occur due to supplier’s disagreement on this price. Given this,
we propose an efficiency measure to show to what extent the
wholesale price contract helps to increase supply chain profit.
For quantity dependent contract, we show that it can coordinate
the supply chain and leads to a proportional division of supply
chain profit. We then generalize the analysis to cover the case of
multiple retailers and single supplier where similar results are
also obtained.
Index Terms—coordination, game theory, quantity dependent
contract, retailer, supply chain, wholesale price contract
I. INTRODUCTION
Supply chain coordination contracts have been extensively
studied. They are attractive because if coordination is achieved,
supply chain profit, which is to be split between retailers and
suppliers, will be maximized, and hence Pareto optimality
is possible. Hence coordination contracts help to solve the
“double marginalization” problem, which was first identified
by Splenger in [7], and lead to a win-win outcome [2], [8].
In this paper, we confine our attention to a supply chain
consisting of only one supplier and one retailer first and then
generalize the analysis to include the situation with multiple
retailers and single supplier.
The majority of existing literature on coordination contracts
consider the newsvendor’s problem with stochastic demand.
But here we assume that retailer can sell out all of his/her order
at the market clearing price. The two kinds of contracts studied
here are wholesale price contract and quantity dependent
contract. Wholesale price contracts are often observed in the
industries because they have a very simple form and the cost
associated with such offer is very low. It can be shown that
certain wholesale price contract is able to induce the retailer
to order at supply chain optimal level. However, supplier may
actually prefer a higher price for his/her own benefit. Hence,
in order for the contract to be agreed upon by both retailer and
supplier, additional transfer payment to the supplier should be
expected and hence extra negotiation or administration cost
occurs. To measure whether such extra effort is worthwhile, we
define the efficiency of the wholesale price contract to show to
what extent the contract helps to boost profit. Next we consider
a quantity dependent contract. Such contract is very similar to
the quantity discount contract (see for instance, [9]) that may
appear in many different forms, because it specifies a price
with dependence on the order level. However, it differs from
the quantity discount contract that the price here needs not to
be decreasing with order level. Cachon has demonstrated in
[2] that proportional profit division can lead to one kind of
quantity discount contract that coordinates the supply chain
with arbitrary profit allocation within a fixed cost model.
Similar method is used here to construct a quantity dependent
contract for coordination within a quadratic cost model.
Here we assume the cost function to be quadratic to approxi-
mate a U-shape average total cost curve. U-shape average total
cost curves have long been recognized in various manufactur-
ing industries. The reason is that some fixed cost arises even
before the start of production process while typically, marginal
cost of production increases with production quantity due to
diminishing marginal productivity. So average fixed cost keeps
decreasing while marginal cost keeps increasing. At early stage
of production, economy of scale is observed because as long
as marginal cost remains below average fixed cost, average
total cost keeps decreasing. However, as production quantity
increases, marginal cost rises above average fixed cost and
leads to increase of average total cost, hence a U-shape cost
curve is formed. A quadratic function can give quite a good
approximation of such U-shape curve. This is the rationale of
setting the cost function to be quadratic.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II
introduces the model and the basic settings; also, the optimal
order level that maximizes the supply chain profit is shown to
exist and its value is given. In Section III, we first investigate
with what price a wholesale price contract can help to induce
the retailer to order at the supply chain profit maximizing level;
we then look into the supplier’s incentive on setting the price
and show that disagreements appear between supply chain’s
and supplier’s choices of price; then we proceed to measure the
efficiency of the wholesale price contract. After that, we apply
the proportional profit devision method to derive a quantity
dependent contract. In Section IV, we extend the analysis to
study a supply chain with multiple retailers and single supplier
where similar results are obtained. Finally, concluding remarks
are given in Section V to discuss further research issues.
II. THE MODEL
In the proposed model, we assume that there is one retailer
and one supplier in the supply chain. The following events
happen in sequence: the supplier produces goods at some cost
and sets a price scheme of the products; next, the retailer
decides the quantity of his/her purchase and then be charged
by the supplier according to that price scheme; finally the
retailer sells all the ordered goods in the market at the market
clearing price. We first show that there exists an optimal level
of purchase by retailer that can maximize the profit of the
supply chain as a whole. This result will be used in later
sections to construct some supply chain coordination contracts.
Here we consider the average total cost of the products to be
a typical U-shape curve. For ease of exposition, we model the
cost function to be a convex quadratic function which serves as
an approximation for such U-shape feature of the cost curve.
Denote the level of purchase made by the retailer as x. The
unit cost function is defined as:
c(x) = ax2 − 2bx + c with a, b, c > 0 (1)
such that c > b2/a to guarantee that c(x) is strictly convex,
positive and has a unique global minimum for x > 0.
Therefore the total cost is: xc(x) = ax3 − 2bx2 + cx. Since
the demand curve of a product is typically down-ward sloping,
the market clearing price when the inventory level is x can be
formulated as:
p(x) = A− ξx with A, ξ > 0. (2)
Here the positive constant A can be regarded as an indi-
cator capturing the market condition (for example, showing
the seasonal fluctuations of demand or reflecting the macro
economic states), with a higher value of A meaning the market
is in a better condition. The reciprocal of the parameter ξ
can be regarded as a proxy for the price elasticity of demand
of the product. Both values are assumed to be known and
stay constant for the time being. Thus the revenue function is
defined as:
R(x) = (A− ξx)x = Ax− ξx2. (3)
We remark that A > c must hold in order to ensure the supplier
to get positive profit through the trade. Now the profit of the
whole supply chain is given by
Π = R(x)− xc(x) = −ax3 + (2b− ξ)x2 + (A− c)x. (4)
The optimal order level x∗ satisfies the first order condition:
∂Π
∂x
= −3ax2 + 2(2b− ξ)x + (A− c) = 0
and the corresponding second order condition. We have
Proposition 1: The profit of the whole supply chain attains
its maximum at the optimal order quantity
x∗ =
(2b− ξ) +√(2b− ξ)2 + 3a(A− c)
3a
. (5)
All proofs can be found in [4].
We note that the optimal order quantity x∗ increases with
A. This means the optimal level of order for the supply chain
as a whole is higher if market condition is better, which is
consistent with intuition. Transfer payment within the supply
chain will not have any impact on the total wealth. Hence
the value of x∗ which maximizes supply chain profit remains
unchanged.
III. WHOLESALE PRICE CONTRACT VS QUANTITY
DEPENDENT CONTRACT
In this section, we devote our effort into searching for a
price scheme offered by the supplier so as to provide incentive
for the retailer to place his/her order exactly at the optimal
order quantity x∗, so that the whole supply chain profit can
be maximized. Two kinds of contracts are looked into in this
section. The first one is called wholesale price contract, which
charges the retailer a fixed price for every unit purchased. The
other one is called quantity dependent contract, which charges
a variable per unit price depending on the order level x.
A. Wholesale Price Contract
Suppose the supplier sets price per unit to be identically w
for every item. Given this, the retailer’s profit would be
ΠR(w) = x(A− ξx)− wx. (6)
In order to maximize this profit, set
∂ΠR(w)
∂x
= 2ξx− (A− w) = 0.
Hence the order level x∗R(w) chosen by the retailer given w
must be
x∗R(w) =
A− w
2ξ
. (7)
We remark that x∗R(w) is a decreasing function in w, which
coincides with intuition, for if the wholesale price increases,
the retailer usually responses with a lower demand. If one
wants to determine value of w such that the order quantity
decided by the retailer is also able to maximize the supply
chain profit, we need x∗R(w) = x∗. Substituting (5) and (7) in
and solving the equation yields:
w =
1
3a
(
3aA− 4ξb + 2ξ2 − 2ξ
√
(2b− ξ)2 + 3a(A− c)
)
.
But for the contract to be feasible, the supplier must be earning
a non-negative profit, i.e., w ≥ c(x) must hold at x = x∗. We
have the following proposition.
Proposition 2: In order for the supplier to earn a non-
negative profit, i.e., w ≥ c(x) at x = x∗, one of the following
conditions must hold:
(a) ξ < b2 or (b) ξ ≥ b2 and A ≥ (2ξ−b)ba + c.
Moreover, if none of these conditions is satisfied, i.e., w <
c(x∗), then the retailer’s order is always less than the supply
chain optimal x∗.
Regarding the first part of Proposition 2, recall that by
construction, the reciprocal of ξ can serve as a proxy for
price elasticity of demand of a product. Hence the proposition
suggests that for a certain kind of product, if it is elastic
enough (with small ξ), the wholesale price contract is always
feasible in the sense that it ensures a non-negative profit for
the supplier. However, if the product has a low elasticity (with
large ξ), for example, some necessities, the contract is feasible
between supplier and retailer only when the market condition
is good enough (with A ≥ (2ξ − b)b/a+c), because otherwise
the supplier will be earning a negative profit. The second part
of the proposition reveals that if the product is very inelastic
and the market condition is very bad, which lead to the failure
of the wholesale price contract, then the retailer will always
order less than the supply chain optimal level.
1) Supplier’s Choice: We have shown that certain whole-
sale price contract can induce the retailer to order at such
a level that the supply chain profit is maximized. In the
following discussion, we show that the supplier’s interests do
not agree with that of the supply chain in the sense that (s)he
will try to set a higher wholesale price if (s)he has the right to
do so. Here we first identify the optimal wholesale price set
by the supplier and then define and calculate the efficiency
of the wholesale price contract so as to illustrate under
what conditions the wholesale price contract can improve the
performance of the supply chain more significantly.
With a wholesale price w, the supplier’s profit is given by
ΠS(w) = wx− xc(x) = −ax3 + 2bx2 + (w − c)x. (8)
The order level x∗R(w) is determined by the retailer when
given the value of w, so if we take the first order derivative
of supplier’s profit with respect to price at w = w, we get
dΠS
dw
∣∣
w=w
=
(
(−3ax2 + 4bx + (w − c)) dxdw + ∂ΠS∂w )
∣∣
w=w
= (−3a(x∗)2 + 4bx∗ + (w − c)) dxdw + x∗ = x∗ > 0.
Hence it can be expected that at w = w and the corresponding
social optimal order level x = x∗, the supplier still has the
incentive to further increase the wholesale price so as to
increase his/her own profit.
In what follows, the optimal wholesale price set by the
supplier will be identified. To distinguish it from the results
we already have, here we denote this optimal value chosen by
supplier as wS and the corresponding optimal order level as
x∗S .
Proposition 3: The wholesale price chosen by the supplier
to maximize his/her own profit is
wS =
(3aA + 4ξ2 − 4bξ)− 2ξ√(2b− 2ξ)2 + 3a(A− c)
3a
.
As a result, the order level decided by the retailer in this case
will be
x∗S =
(2b− 2ξ) +√(2b− 2ξ)2 + 3a(A− c)
3a
. (9)
Comparing the wholesale price wS and w set by the supplier
and the supply chain respectively, the following conclusion can
be drawn.
Proposition 4: The supplier prefers a higher wholesale
price than that chosen by the supply chain, i.e., wS > w.
This proposition confirms the implication from dΠS/dw >
0 at w = w.
2) Efficiency of the Wholesale Price Contract: We define
the efficiency of the wholesale price contract as:
R =
Π(wS)
Π(w)
. (10)
It is the supply chain profit without wholesale price contract
over the one with the contract. Obviously R ∈ [0, 1). More-
over, if R is small, it means the wholesale price contract
helps to significantly boost the profit of the supply chain
when compared to the case where the contract is absent and
the supplier can set the wholesale price freely. Recall that
previously, we already have equations (4), (5), and (9). So it
is straightforward to check that{
Π(w) =
1
27a2
(2(y
2
+ z)(y +
√
y2 + z) + yz)
Π(wS) =
1
27a2
(2((2b + ξ)yS + z)(yS +
√
yS2 + z) + (2b + ξ)z)
with y = 2b− ξ, yS = 2b− 2ξ and z = 3a(A− c). Hence we
have
R =
Π(wS)
Π(w)
=
2((2b + ξ)yS + z)(yS +
√
y2S + z) + (2b + ξ)z
2(y2 + z)(y +
√
y2 + z) + yz
.
Proposition 5: We have the following two results for the
efficiency R:
(a) limξ→0 R = 1 and (b) lima(A−c)→0 R ∈ [ 2027 , 1].
We remark that the first limit shows the wholesale price
contract is less urgent for more elastic products (with smaller
ξ), since even if the right to set the wholesale price is entitled
to the supplier, the resulting supply chain profit is still quite
close to the optimized one. However, when dealing with
more inelastic product, the importance of the wholesale price
contract becomes more significant because it helps to increase
supply chain profit to a greater degree. The second limit shows
that when the market condition is very bad (with smaller A),
we can predict that if wholesale price contract is not put in
practice, the worst case for the supply chain is that it only
earns 20/27 ≈ 74% of the amount that it could have earned
with the contract. Here we exhibit some numerical examples
(Fig. 1 & Fig. 2) to show the behavior of R under different
sets of parameters.
Note that in these two pairs of examples, a similar phe-
nomenon which can be observed is that: while letting a, b
and c stay the same, the parameter of the second figure lets
a(A− c) to be a much smaller value, and hence R displays a
different behavior.
B. Quantity Dependent Contract
Suppose now the supplier charges the retailer w(x) for per
unit purchased, where the price w(x) is depending on the
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Fig. 1. Dependence of R on ξ with a = 1, b = 1, c = 2
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Fig. 2. Dependence of R on ξ with a = 5, b = 3, c = 3
purchase level x. In this case, retailer’s profit becomes
ΠR = (A− ξx)x− w(x)x. (11)
In order to align interests of the retailer with that of the supply
chain and hence to induce the retailer to choose the social
optimal order quantity x∗, we let
ΠR = λΠ with 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. (12)
Substituting (4) and (11) in and simplifying it gives:
w(x) = (1− λ)(A− ξx) + λ(ax2 − 2bx + c). (13)
In this contract w(x∗) ≥ c(x∗) always holds, because for the
supply chain to earn a non-negative profit (which is the sum
of profits of both the supplier and retailer), we must have the
inequality A− ξx∗ ≥ a(x∗)2− 2bx∗+ c holds. That is to say,
such contract is feasible regardless of the market condition and
elasticity of the product. This can be reckoned as an advantage
of this quantity dependent contract over the wholesale price
contract for it can be more widely used.
We can also write w(x) in another way as:
w(x) = aλx2 − (2bλ + ξ(1− λ))x + A(1− λ) + cλ. (14)
So it can be seen that w(x) is actually a quadratic function
of x. We further remark that this quantity dependent contract
helps to allocate a proportion of λ of the total supply chain
profit to the retailer and a proportion of (1−λ) to the supplier.
The final division of total wealth may depend on the bargaining
power of the two parties or some other factors. Similar method
of imposing proportional profit devision has been used by
Cachon in [2] to derive a quantity discount contract under
a newsvendor’s model with fixed per unit cost.
IV. EXTENSION TO MULTIPLE RETAILERS
In all previous discussions, we always assume that there is
only one retailer and one supplier in the supply chain. In this
section, we generalize the previous analysis to study a supply
chain composed of multiple retailers and single supplier. We
further assume that all the retailers are homogeneous in the
sense that they all face a same market clearing price and a
same wholesale price scheme. Since for the supply chain as a
whole, the total revenue and total cost are unchanged, so the
optimal level of order also stays the same, i.e., supply chain
profit is maximized when
x = x∗ =
(2b− ξ) +√(2b− ξ)2 + 3a(A− c)
3a
.
Here we first give some basic settings and notations as
follows. As in Section II, cost function is assumed to be
quadratic, specifically: c(x) = ax2 − 2bx + c stands for the
average total cost. There are n retailers (n ≥ 1). Ordering
decisions are made by them independently to maximize their
own profits, denote their order levels as x1, x2, . . . , xn respec-
tively and Xn =
∑n
i=1 xi. For expositional simplicity, define
xi = Xn − xi. Here the market clearing price depends on the
total orders from all retailers, so market clearing price will be
given by A− ξXn.
A. Wholesale Price Contract
In this section we assume that the supplier charges all
retailers a fixed price for per unit purchased, whose value is
independent of the order levels. To distinguish it from previous
results, denote the wholesale price here by wn. For the i-th
retailer, his/her profit will be
Πi(wn) = [A− ξ(xi + xi)]xi − wnxi. (15)
In order to maximize his/her own profit, the optimal order
level for the i-th retailer, which is denoted as x∗i (wn), must
be the solution to 0 = ∂Πi/∂xi = A − 2ξxi − ξxi − wn.
Solving it yields
x∗i (wn) =
A− ξx∗i (wn)− wn
2ξ
and it holds for all i’s.
X∗n(wn) =
n∑
i=1
x∗i (wn) = n
(
A− wn
2ξ
)
− 1
2
(n− 1)X∗n(wn).
Further simplification gives
X∗n(wn) =
n
n + 1
(
A− wn
ξ
)
. (16)
Then in order to induce the retailers to make an aggregate
order at the social optimal level, we need:
X∗n(wn) = x
∗ (17)
Substituting (5) and (16) in and solving the equation yields:
wn =
1
3a
[3aA− ( (n + 1)ξ
n
)((2b−ξ)+
√
(2b− ξ)2 + 3a(A− c))]
Proposition 6: In order to have wn ≥ c(x) at x = x∗, one
of the following conditions must hold:
(a) ξ < 2nn+3b or
(b) ξ ≥ 2nn+3b and A ≥ c + 1a (n+3n ξ − 2b)( 12b− n−14n ξ).
Note that the following inequality holds:
wn − w = n− 13an ξ((2b− ξ) +
√
(2b− ξ)2 + 3a(A− c)) > 0
Hence, when more retailers enter the market, the wholesale
price that coordinates the supply chain increases while the
coordinating order level remains unchanged. So the supplier’s
profit has in fact increased. This means, when there are more
retailers, the coordination contract will be more attractive to
the supplier.
1) Supplier’s Choice: In the previous discussions, we iden-
tify the level of wholesale price that can coordinate the
supply chain. In this subsection, we explore the supplier’s
own incentive on setting the wholesale price in the presence
of multiple retailers. And then we will define and calculate
the efficiency of the wholesale price contract. To distinguish
results here from those above, denote the optimal wholesale
price set by the supplier and the corresponding aggregate order
level by all the retailers as wnS and X∗nS respectively.
In the last section, we have seen that when given the whole-
sale price wn, the retailers, by independently maximizing their
own profits, decide to make an aggregate order of the amount
X∗n(wn) = (n(A− wn))/((n + 1)ξ). Hence, when supplier
is making the pricing decision, (s)he expects this. Thus the
supplier’s profit can be rewritten as:
ΠnS(wn)
= −a(X∗n(wn))3 + 2b(X∗n(wn))2 + (wnS − c)X∗n(wn)
= −a(n(A−wn)(n+1)ξ )3 + 2b(n(A−wn)(n+1)ξ )2 + (wn − c)n(A−wn)(n+1)ξ
So as for maximization, we set dΠnSdwn = 0.
Solving the equation gives:
wnS =
1
3a
(
3aA− (n + 1
n
)ξ(ynS +
√
y2nS + z)
)
(18)
with y = 2b− ξ, ynS = 2b− n+1n ξ and z = 3a(A− c).
It can be easily checked that second order condition is satis-
fied: (∂2Π/∂w2)
∣∣
w=wnS
= −2(n/(n + 1)ξ)2√y2nS + z < 0.
By
X∗n(wn) =
n(A− wn)
(n + 1)ξ
,
we get the corresponding X∗nS as follows:
X∗nS =
(2b− n+1n ξ) +
√
(2b− n+1n ξ)2 + 3a(A− c)
3a
. (19)
2) Efficiency of the Wholesale Price Contract: As in the
single-retailer case, here we define the efficiency of the whole-
sale price contract as
Rn =
Π(wnS)
Π(wn)
(20)
which compares the supply chain profit with and without
the wholesale price contract. Obviously R ∈ [0, 1). A lower
value of R indicates the wholesale price contract’s impact on
increasing the supply chain profit is more significant. Recall
that we have equations (4), (5) and (19). So substitution and
direct computation gives:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
Π(wn) =
1
27a2
(2(y2 + z)(y +
√
y2 + z) + yz)
Π(wnS) =
1
27a2
(2((2b− n− 2
n
ξ)ynS + z)·
(ynS +
√
y2nS + z) + (2b− n−2n ξ)z)
Hence
Rn =
Π(wnS)
Π(wn)
=
2((2b− n−2
n
ξ)ynS + z)(ynS +
√
y2nS + z) + (2b− n−2n ξ)z
2(y2 + z)(y +
√
y2 + z) + yz
.
By straightforward checking we have the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 7: The following limits hold for Rn
(a) limξ→0 Rn = 1 and limn→∞Rn = 1.
Here we exhibit some numerical examples (Fig. 3 & Fig.
4) to show how R behave under different sets of parameters.
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Fig. 3. Dependence of R on ξ with a = 1, b = 1, c = 2 and A = 40
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B. Quantity Dependent Contract
In this subsection, we assume that the supplier charges the
i-th retailer w(xi) for per unit purchased, where the value of
w(xi) depends on xi, the i-th retailer’s order level.
Proposition 8: A quantity dependent contract with
w(x) = (1− λ)(A−
n+1
n − 2λ
2(1− λ) nξx) + λ(an
2x2 − 2bnx + c)
is a coordination contract because given such wholesale price
scheme, there is one Nash Equilibrium of the game given as
follows:
x∗1 = x
∗
2 = . . . = x
∗
n =
x∗
n
(21)
i.e, the aggregate order by all the retailers is the one that
maximizes the supply chain profit.
Moreover, it is required that
λ >
(n− 1)ξ
2n
√
(2b− ξ)2 + 3a(A− c) . (22)
Note that when x∗1 = x∗2 = . . . = x∗n = x
∗
n , the following
equality holds:
n∑
i=1
Πi = λΠ +
1− n
2n
ξ(x∗)2. (23)
One can see that in this multiple-retailer case, the parameter λ
does not directly represent the proportion of total profit earned
by all retailers, which is different from the single-retailer case.
In fact, aggregate profit of retailers is smaller than λΠ for any
n > 1. Moreover, since (1− n)ξ(x∗)2/2n decreases with n,
hence with more retailers, their total profit is smaller than λΠ
by a larger amount.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we study how to improve incentive within a
supply chain by implementing two kinds of contracts, namely,
wholesale price contract and quantity dependent contract. The
motivation of doing so is that if supply chain coordination
can be achieved given these incentives, supply chain profit
can then be maximized. Since this profit represents the total
wealth within the chain that is going to be split among supply
chain participants, Pareto optimality is possible in this case
and win-win outcome can be attained. Although supply chain
coordination contracts have been extensively studied, most of
the existing literature assume a fixed average total cost yet here
we are considering a quadratic cost function which is able to
approximate the U-shape cost curves commonly observed in
various manufacturing industries and hence give results that
can serve as references for a wide range of industries.
Attention is first focused on a supply chain consisting of
one retailer and one supplier. We identify an optimal order
level that maximizes the supply chain profit. Then it is shown
that a properly designed wholesale price contract can induce
the retailer to order exactly at that level and hence results in
a maximal supply chain profit. However, we then demonstrate
that if the supplier is entitled the right to set the wholesale
price for his/her own account, actually a higher wholesale
price would be preferred even though it leads to a socially sub-
optimal outcome. Hence, it should be expected that in order
to carry out the wholesale price contract, additional transfer
payment from retailer to supplier is needed to bring supplier
into such contract, so extra negotiation or administration cost
would occur. Thus, it motivates us to measure the efficiency
of the contract to see whether such extra effort is worth or not.
So we define the efficiency of the wholesale price contract R
to be the total profit with supplier’s choice of wholesale price
over the total profit with the supply chain optimal wholesale
price. A lower value of R means the wholesale price contract
is capable of increasing the supply chain profit to a higher
degree. Supply chain participants can make their decisions
based on such measure. Apart from wholesale price contract,
the discussion that follows is devoted to constructing a quantity
dependent contract whose wholesale price is depending on
the order level. It is demonstrated that there exists a quantity
dependent contract which is able to coordinate the supply
chain and results in a proportional devision of supply chain
profit between supplier and retailer. Next the model is gen-
eralized to study a supply chain with multiple retailers and
single supplier. Again we show the existence of a wholesale
price contract inducing the retailers to order at an aggregate
level that maximizes supply chain profit, but the supplier’s
interests may deviate from this wholesale price. Efficiency of
the wholesale price contract in multiple-retailer case is hence
defined. And then, we show that there is a quantity dependent
contract leading to a Nash Equilibrium in which the retailers
will make an aggregate order coincides with the supply chain
profit maximizing order.
There are different possibilities for future research. For
instance, we may consider modifying the contracts to deal
with more complicated problems or generalizing the results to
other settings.
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